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Abstract—The popularity and widespread usage of online
social networks (OSN) have attracted cyber criminals who have
used OSNs as a platform to spread malware. Among different
types of malware in OSNs, Trojan is the most popular type with
hundreds of attacks on OSN users in the past few years. Trojans
infecting a user’s computer have the ability to steal confidential
information, install ransomware and infect other computers in
the network. Therefore, it is important to understand propagation
dynamics of Trojans in OSNs in order to detect, contain and
remove them as early as possible. In this article, we present
an analytical model to study propagation characteristics of
Trojans and factors that impact their propagation in an online
social network. The proposed model assumes all the topological
characteristics of real online social networks. Moreover, the
model takes into account attacking trends of modern Trojans,
the role of anti-virus (AV) products, and security practices of
OSN users and AV software providers. By taking into account
these factors, the proposed model can accurately and realistically
estimate the infection rate caused by a Trojan malware in an OSN
as well as the recovery rate of the user population.
Index Terms—online social networks, malware, worms, Trojan,
propagation, modeling, simulation, undirected graphs, anti-virus,
disinfection
I. INTRODUCTION
OLINE social networking are amongst the most popularservices offered through the World Wide Web. Online
social networks (OSNs) such as Facebook, Twitter and MyS-
pace have provided hundreds of millions of people with a
means to connect and communicate with their friends, families
and colleagues around the world. For instance, Facebook is the
second most visited website in the world according to a recent
ranking by Alexa [1], only after Google.
The popularity and wide spread usage of OSNs have
attracted hackers and cyber criminals to use OSNs as an
attack platform to spread malware [2], [3]. A successful
attack using malware in an OSN can lead to tens of millions
of OSN accounts being compromised and users’ computers
being infected. Cyber criminals can mount massive denial of
service attacks against Internet infrastructures or systems using
compromised accounts and computers. They can steal users’
sensitive information for fraudulent activities. Compromised
OSN accounts can also be used to spread misinformation to
bias public opinions [4], or even to influence automatic trading
algorithms that rely on public opinions [5]. (Automatic trading
algorithms place buy/sell stock orders on behalf of human
investors.)
The authors are with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Com-
puter Science, York University, Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada, Email:
{faghani,utn}@cse.yorku.ca.
A. Overview of OSN Malware
There are two major types of malware that target online
social network users: : cross-site scripting worm and Trojan:
• Cross-site scripting (XSS) worms: These are passive
malware that exploits vulnerabilities in web applications
to propagate themselves without any user intervention.
• Trojans: A Trojan is a type of malware that is often dis-
guised as legitimate software. Users are typically tricked
by some form of social engineering into opening them
(and thus loading and executing Trojans on their systems).
Trojans are the most common method used to launch
attacks against OSNs users, who are tricked into visiting
malicious websites and subsequently downloading mal-
ware disguised as legitimate software (e.g., Adobe Flash
player). There are many variants of Trojans operating in
OSNs, including clickjacking worms [6] and extension-
based malware [7].
Compared with XSS worm, Trojan is the more popular type
of malware targeting OSN users. Over the past few years,
Facebook users have experienced hundreds of separate Trojan
malware attacks [8]–[10]. For instance, the first variant of
an OSN Trojan browser extension called Kilim appeared in
November 2014 [8]. From November 2014 to November 2016,
almost 600 variants of Kilim were discovered [11]. In most
cases, a Trojan disguises itself as a legitimate software. For
instance in two major Trojan attacks on Facebook, the Trojan
posed itself as an Adobe Flash player update [9], [10]. In a
more recent attack discovered in 2015 [9], a message enticed
the victims to click on a link that redirected them to a third-
party website unaffiliated with Facebook where they were
prompted to download what was claimed to be an update of
the Adobe Flash player. If they downloaded and executed the
file, they would infect their computers with a Trojan malware.
Trojans installed on a user’s computer have the ability
to access contents on the compromised system, including
social network contents, credit card information, and login
credentials. It can even spread itself further by infecting other
systems on the same network. Such Trojans have the ability to
form a botnet to open up channels for attackers to send further
payloads such as ransomware. Such a Trojan is a variant
of Locky ransomware discovered in November 2016 [12],
which was delivered via JPEG and SVG files via Facebook
Messenger.
B. Motivations
Given the popularity of and potential damages inflicted
by Trojans, it is important to understand their propagation
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dynamics in OSNs in order to detect, contain and remove them
as early as possible. Therefore, our objective is to model and
study the propagation of Trojans in social networks such as
Facebook, LinkedIn and Orkut. (These networks can be repre-
sented by undirected graphs, in which each vertex represents a
user, and each edge represents the mutual relationship between
the two users denoted by the two end vertices.)
The topic of Trojan propagation in OSNs has only been
studied recently. Most of these studies are based on simulations
[3], [13]–[15]. Thomas et al. [10] traced the activities of
Koobface, a Trojan that targeted OSN users, for one month
to study its propagation characteristics.
There exist few works on the topic of modeling propagations
of malware in OSNs. Faghani and his collaborators [16], [17]
modeled the propagation of XSS worms in OSNs. Sanzgiri
et al. [18] modeled the propagation of Trojans in the social
network Twitter where most relationships are one-directional
(follower-followee), unlike mutual relationships in Facebook
or LinkedIn networks.
There exist works that model propagations of worms and
malware (not necessarily Trojans) in other types of networks
such as people, email and cellular phones. Many of these
models [19]–[22] assumed that each user is directly connected
to every other user in the same network (also known as
“homogeneous mixing”). This assumption does not hold true
for a real-world OSN such as Facebook where each user
is directly connected to only his/her friends. As a result,
the “homogeneous mixing” assumption may lead to an over-
estimation of the infection rate in a real OSN [23], [24]. Cheng
et al. [25] proposed a propagation model for malware that
targets multimedia messaging service (MMS) and bluetooth
devices. Chen and Ji [26] and Chen et al. [27] modeled the
spreading of scanning worms1 in computer networks. Zou et
al. [24] and Komnios et al. [28] studied the propagation of
email worms. Wen et al. [23] also modeled the propagation
of malware in email networks and in semi-directed networks
represented by mixed graphs (i.e., a subset of edges are
directed while the others are undirected).
Besides the network topology, there are several other factors
that affect the propagation of Trojans in social networks.
For example, anti-virus (AV) products play an important role
in protecting users against malware and thus slowing down
their propagation. On the other hand, malware programs have
recently become more and more sophisticated and able to
evade detection by AV products. A recent test of AV products
on the market performed by Virus Bulletin in 2016 [29] shows
that the rate of detection of unknown malware samples is
around 67% to 70%. (The same article suggests that this
number will get smaller over time as malware becomes more
sophisticated.) In response to novel malware, AV vendors
need to update their products and provide patches against
them. It takes time to understand the working mechanism
of a new malware and come up with solutions against it.
The faster AV vendors release updates/patches, the higher the
chance of stopping the malware. Another factor that impacts
1Scanning worms scan targets, such as computers, routers, etc. for ex-
ploitable vulnerabilities in order to deliver malicious payloads via these
exploits.
the propagation of recent Trojans is their ability to prevent
users from accessing websites of AV vendors so that the users
cannot download updates/patches. There have been several
instances of such malware [7], [9], [10], [30]–[32] including
those targeting Facebook users such as Magnet [9], Koobface
[10], and extension-based malware [7]. In response to this
new ability of Trojans, infected users have reached out to
their OSN friends, asking for clean-up solutions to remove
the malware from their systems, as in the case of a large-scale
attack on Facebook caused by a malware named Magnet [9].
All the above factors have an impact on propagation dynamics
of Trojans in OSNs; however, none of previous works on
modeling worms/malware in OSNs considered these factors.
C. Contributions
Having identified gaps in existing research, we propose an
analytical model that
• considers characteristics of modern Trojans (e.g, mal-
ware blocking users’ access to AV provider websites),
security practices (e.g., users installing AV products on
their computers, AV manufacturers gradually releasing
updates/patches against a newly propagating malware),
and user behaviour (e.g., seeking assistance from OSN
friends to clean up infected computers). None of previous
works on modeling worms/malware in OSNs considered
the above factors.
• assumes the topological characteristics of real-world so-
cial networks, namely, low average shortest distance,
power-law distribution of node degrees and high clus-
tering coefficient [33]–[35]. In this article, we consider
OSNs that are represented by undirected graphs such
as Facebook, Linked and Orkut. To the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first that models Trojan
propagation in such networks. (In the future we will
extend the model to OSNs represented by directed graphs
such as Twitter.)
• is validated using a real-world social network graph,
a Facebook sub-graph constructed by McAuley and
Leskovec [36] that possess all the characteristics of online
social networks as mentioned above. In all experiments
we studied, numerical results obtained from the model
closely match simulation results, demonstrating the ac-
curacy of the model.
• has low computational complexity while being accurate
and taking into account a wide range of influencing
factors discussed above. In particular, the computational
complexity is O(E), where E is the number of edges in
the network graph.
In the future, Trojan malware may become even more
sophisticated with more attacking vectors, which we may not
be able to anticipate presently. By taking into account attacking
trends of modern Trojans and security practices, our proposed
model can be extended for future modeling of OSN Trojans
that have more sophisticated attacking mechanisms.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the topological characteristics of OSNs.
In Section III, we discuss the propagation mechanism of
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Trojan malware in OSNs. In Sections IV and V, we describe
the proposed analytical model. We validate the model in
Section VI. We discuss related work in Section IX and finally
we conclude the article in Section X.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
An OSN can be represented by an equivalent graph in which
each vertex (or node) represents a person, and a link between
two vertices indicates a relationship (friendship) between the
two respective persons. There exist many OSNs in which the
relationship (friendship) between two users is mutual (e.g.,
Facebook, LinkedIn, Orkut), and thus, they can be represented
by undirected graphs.
Online social networks have distinct characteristics that dis-
tinguish them from other types of networks such as computer
networks. Following are the characteristics of OSNs [33]–[35]:
1) An OSN typically has a low average shortest path
distance, approximately equal to log(s)/ log(d), where
s is the number of vertices (people), and d is the average
vertex degree of the equivalent graph [34].
2) Online social networks typically show a high clustering
property, or high local transitivity. That is, if person A
knows B and C, then B and C are likely to know each
other. Thus A, B and C form a friendship triangle. Let
k denote the degree of a vertex v. Then the number
of all possible triangles originated from vertex v is
k(k − 1)/2. Let f denote the number of friendship
triangles of a vertex v in a social network graph. Then
the clustering coefficient C(v) of vertex v is defined as
C(v) = 2f/(k(k − 1)). The clustering coefficient of
a graph is the average of the clustering coefficients of
all of its vertices. In a real OSN, the average clustering
coefficient is about 0.1 to 0.7 [33], [34].
3) Node degrees of a social network graph tend to be
power-law distributed. The node degree of a power-law
topology is a right-skewed distribution with a power-law
Complementary Cumulative Density Function (CCDF)
of F (k) ∝ k−α, which is linear on a logarithmic scale.
The power law distribution states that the probability for
a node v to have a degree k is P (k) ∝ k−α, where α
is the power-law exponent [37].
To validate our proposed model and run simulations, we
used a real-world graph that possesses all the characteristics
of a social network. The graph was derived from a Facebook
data set provided by McAuley and Leskovec [36] as part of
the Stanford Network Analysis Project (SNAP). This data set
was built in 2012 using a Facebook application that conducted
a survey to collect users’ information such as their friend lists
and shared information on their profiles [36]. The resulting
graph has all the OSN characteristics discussed above. Table
I summarizes the characteristics of this social network graph.
III. PROPAGATION MECHANISM OF TROJAN MALWARE IN
ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
In this section, we describe the process used by one or more
real-world Trojan malware (e.g., Koobface [10], Magnet [9]
and generic extension based malware [7] such as Kilim [8],
TABLE I: Parameters of the Facebook sub-graph
Parameter OSN
Number of vertices (people) 4,039
Number of edges 88,234
Average clustering coefficient 0.60
Average shortest path length 3.7
Network diameter 8
Maximum node degree 45
Average node degree d 43.69
log(N)/ log(d) 1.6
[11] to attack OSN users and propagate in a network. Such a
process consists of three stages:
1) In the first stage, the malware developer creates one or
more fake profiles and infiltrates them into the social
network. The purpose of these fake profiles is to make
friends with as many real OSN users as possible. In-
filtration has been shown to be an effective technique
for disseminating malicious content in OSNs such as
Facebook [5].
2) In the second stage, the malware developer uses social
engineering techniques to create eye-catching web links
that trick users into clicking on them. The web links,
which are posted on the fake users’ walls, lead un-
suspecting users to a web page that contains malicious
content. A user simply needs to visit or “drive by” that
web page, and the malicious code can be downloaded
in the background and executed on the user’s computer
without his/her knowledge. This type of attack is called
drive-by download and is caused by vulnerabilities in
browsers, apps or operating systems that are out of date
and have security flaws [38].
When security flaws are absent, malware creators resort
to social engineering techniques to get assistance from
users to activate the malicious code. For instance, after
a user lands on the malicious web page, he/she is asked
to click on a button to download a software (e.g., an
updated version of the Adobe Flash player) or to play a
video. If the user clicks on the button, he/she is actually
downloading and executing a malware.
In either case, drive-by or user-assisted download, the
user’s computer is infected. The computer can then be
controlled by the attacker(s) to perform other malicious
activities such as stealing confidential information stored
on the computer, attacking other computers on the same
network, or mounting denial of service attacks against
vulnerable websites.
3) In the third stage, after a user u is infected, the malware
also posts the eye-catching web link(s) on the user’s
wall (i.e., via newsfeed), to “recruit” his/her friends. If
a friend of u clicks on the link(s) and, as a result, un-
knowingly executes the malware, the friend’s computer
and profile will become infected as described in stage
2 and the propagation cycle continues with his/her own
friends.
The above process is illustrated by the diagram shown in
Fig. 1. In this example, the malware posts a malicious link on
an infected user’s wall, enticing the infected user’s friends to
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John Smith
December 15, 2015
Like   Comment   Share 
Have you guys seen this? This behavior is 
unacceptable. http://www.tinyurl.com/...
Amazing Video
ERROR
Download
You are missing the plugin to play 
this video. Please download the 
plugin now.
1 2
34
Fig. 1: Example of Trojan malware propagation in online social networks
watch a video (step 1). Friends of the infected user who follow
the malicious link will land on a web page that hosts an object
that looks similar to a video player (step 2). After clicking the
“play” button, the friend receives a notification that he/she
requires a software (or a “plugin”) in order to watch the video
(step 3). Users who download and execute the “plugin” are
actually and unknowingly executing the malware and become
infected (step 4). The malware will then post the malicious
link on the walls of the newly infected users to lure their
friends to the web page that hosts the fake video player, and
the propagation cycle continues with more new victims. Note
that the wall concept may not exist in some social networks.
In this case, we can assume, without loss of generality, that
the malware sends the malicious link directly to an infected
user’s friends via the OSN private messaging system.
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED MALWARE
PROPAGATION MODEL
In this section, we present an overview of the proposed
model and underlying assumptions.
A. Modeling Approach
In the literature, epidemic models can be classified into
two main categories: SIS (susceptible-infected-susceptible)
and SIR (susceptible-infected-recovered). SIS models [22],
[39]–[41] assume that an infected user, after being disinfected,
will become susceptible again and thus may be re-infected by
the same disease (malware). SIR models [19]–[21], [23], [26],
on the other hand, assume that an infected user, after being
disinfected (having recovered or becoming immune), will not
be re-infected again by the same disease (malware).
The SIS approach is not suitable for modeling Trojans in
online social networks, because it does not support the immune
state. In practice, users who have anti-virus software installed
may be immune against a particular malware.
Our proposed model is based on the SIR approach. Pre-
vious SIR models suffer from one or more of the following
drawbacks:
• Many models [19]–[22] assume homogeneous mixing as
mentioned earlier, and thus overestimate the infection rate
in a real OSN.
• Some models [25], [26] assume that users check newly ar-
riving messages at every time unit, and all users have the
same message checking time (usually one time interval).
These models do not consider the temporal dynamics of
user activities.
• Some models incur high computational complexity, such
as O(E2) [23], where E is the number of edges (friend-
ships) of the social network graph.
Our proposed model is a spatial-temporal SIR model that
takes into account the topological characteristics of real-world
social networks and temporal dynamics of user activities.
Furthermore, it considers characteristics of modern Trojans
(e.g, malware blocking users’ access to AV provider web-
sites), security practices (e.g., users installing AV products
on their computers, AV manufacturers gradually releasing up-
dates/patches against a newly propagating malware), and user
behaviour (e.g., seeking assistance from OSN friends to clean
up infected computers). None of previous works on modeling
worms/malware in OSNs considered the above factors. The
proposed model has low computational complexity, in the
order of O(E).
B. User States
We assume that all the users are vulnerable to the new
malware M when it first appears in the social network, i.e.,
at t = 0. That is, all users are in the susceptible state at
time t = 0. As time passes, susceptible users may stay
susceptible, or transition to the immune state thanks to a
defensive mechanism such as an antivirus program against
malware M , or become infected by the malware after clicking
on the malicious link. Infected users can recover by finding
clean-up solutions to remove the malware from their systems,
or may stay infected. If users have recovered from an infection
or become immune, they are no longer vulnerable to malware
M and thus will no longer be infected by it.
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Therefore, at a specific point in time, each node (user) in
the network can be in one of the following four different states
with respect to a particular malware M: susceptible, infected,
recovered and immune.
• A susceptible node is a node that is vulnerable to malware
infection but otherwise “healthy”.
• An infected node is a node that became infected and may
potentially infect other nodes.
• A recovered node is a node that was infected but the user
was able to find solutions to remove the malware from his
computer and profile; the node is thus no longer infected
or susceptible to the malware M.
• An immune node is a node that is unable to become
infected thanks to a defensive mechanism existing on the
system (e.g., having an antivirus program able to detect
and block the malware M). A node may also be immune
to the malware M because the user’s operating system is
not targeted by the malware. For example, the malware
exploits a vulnerability in and attacks only Windows
systems, but not Linux or Mac systems.
At time t = 0, all users are in the susceptible state. At each
time unit t > 0, a user i may move from one state to another, as
shown in Figure 2, which depicts the state transition diagram
of a user. The definitions of the transitional probabilities γi(t),
βi(t) and αi(t) are provided in Table II; their computations
are discussed in Sections V-A, V-B and V-C, respectively.
Sus
Inf Rec
Imm1− γi(t)− βi(t)
γi(t)
βi(t)
αi(t)
1− αi(t) 1
1
Fig. 2: State transition diagram of node i
To model the user states, we define random variable Xi(t)
to denote the state of node i at each time unit t, as follows:
Xi(t) =

Sus, if node i is susceptible at time t;
Inf, if node i is infected at time t;
Rec, if node i is recovered at time t;
Imm if node i is immune at time t
(1)
C. Temporal Dynamics
We consider the temporal dynamics of user activities by
defining τi as the message checking time period of user
i. That is, user i visits the social network and check new
posts or messages every τi time units. This definition of user
message checking time is common in previous works [23],
[24], [26]. According to this definition, at each time unit
t, all the users whose τi values satisfying (t mod τi = 0)
visit the OSN and check their messages. A user i’s message
checking time is defined formally using a discrete random
variable P (visiti(t) = true) as follows:
P (visiti(t) = true) =
{
1, if t mod τi = 0;
0 otherwise
(2)
For instance, if τi = 10, user i would visit the OSN and
check messages at time t = 10, 20, 30, . . . . Another user j
may vist the OSN more often than user i and has τj = 4.
User j would visit the OSN and check messages at time
t = 4, 8, 12, . . . . We take into account the temporal dynamics
of user activities in our model by considering user message
checking time τi.
D. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
1) To simplify the discussion of the model, we assume each
user is associated with only one device that is used to
access the social network such as a smart phone, tablet,
laptop or desktop. (In practice a user may have access
to multiple devices, such as a desktop computer at work
[owned by the employer] and a smart phone [personally
owned by the user]. In this case, the user usually avoids
using the employer-owned computer for personal use.)
2) When we say “a user is infected”, we mean that the user
unknowingly downloaded and executed the malware
(step 2 in Section III), and his computer is subsequently
infected.
3) Each user has his/her own device to access the social
network (i.e., no two users share the same device.).
4) We assume a single infiltrating user in the first stage
of the propagation process described Section III. In
our future work, we will extend our model to support
multiple infiltrating nodes. Note, however, that the use
of many infiltrating nodes may trigger early detection of
the malware in the network.
5) We assume that a new malware M appears and starts
propagating at time t = 0.
In addition to the above assumptions, we also assume that a
percentage of the OSN population, βmax, have AV programs
installed on their systems. According to a survey conducted by
Microsoft, 75% of the respondents reported that they installed
AV products on their computers [42]. We will assume βmax =
0.75 in our experiments. Note, however, that only a subset of
these AV products are effective against the new malware M . In
other words, only a percentage of the OSN population, βmin,
where βmin ≤ βmax, are immune to malware M at time t = 0.
(Analogically, a flu vaccine may not be effective against all the
flu strains, especially new strains.) The value of βmin depends
on the novelty and sophistication of malware M . The more
novel and sophisticated malware M is, the lower the value of
βmin.
Infected users may seek clean-up solutions to disinfect their
systems by themselves (independent disinfection), or with
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help from their friends from the social network (collabo-
rative disinfection). The issues of collaborative disinfection
and independent disinfection will be discussed in detail in
Sections VII-C and VII-D, respectively.
E. Objective of the Model
The objective of the model is to estimate the expected num-
ber of users EX(t) in each state X = {Sus, Inf,Rec, Imm}
at each time unit t.
EX(t) =
i=V∑
i=1
P (Xi(t) = X),
where P (Xi(t) = X) denotes the probability of user i being in
state X at time t. For example, EInf (t) =
∑i=V
i=1 P (Xi(t) =
Inf) gives the expected number of infected users in the
network at time t.
To compute the probability of user i being in state X
at time t, P (Xi(t) = X), we need to compute the prob-
abilities of user i transitioning from one state to another,
namely probabilities γi(t), βi(t) and αi(t) shown in Fig.
2. In Sections V-A to V-C, we discuss the computations
of γi(t), βi(t) and αi(t), respectively. In Section V-D, we
discuss the computation of P (Xi(t) = X) and EX(t), where
X = {Sus, Inf,Rec, Imm}, to complete the model. To
facilitate the description of the model, we summarize the
mathematical notations in Table II.
V. THE PROPOSED MALWARE PROPAGATION MODEL
In this section, we discuss the computations of the transition
probabilities γi(t), βi(t) and αi(t), and the expected number
of users in each state X where X = {Sus, Inf,Rec, Imm}.
A. Transition from Susceptible to Infected State
Let γi(t) denote the transition probability of node i from
the susceptible state to the infected state at each time t. This
transition probability depends on two factors:
• The states of node i’s neighbors. The more infected
neighbors i has, the higher the probability i will get
infected.
• The probability pi of user i executing the malware. The
higher the probability pi, the higher the probability i will
get infected.
Therefore, the probability γi(t) of user i transitioning from
the susceptible to the infected state is given by the following
equation:
γi(t) = 1−
∏
j∈Ni
(1− piP (Xj(t− 1) = Inf)) (3)
where Ni is the set of node i’s neighbors.
Note that probability pi depends on several factors such as
the probability of user i viewing the malicious link on her
wall (or in the private message box), the trust level between
user i and her friend j who posted the link, the probability of
following the malicious link by clicking on it, the probability
of downloading the malware and the probability of executing
the malware. In Appendix A of the supplementary file, we
discuss the factors that affects probability pi in detail.
B. Transition from Susceptible to Immune State
Users can benefit from antivirus (AV) software products to
protect themselves against malware attacks. Users install AV
software either proactively to prevent infections, or reactively
to disinfect their systems after being infected. In the former
case, an effective AV software against a malware M allows
a user to transition from the susceptible to the immune state
(with respect to malware M ). In the latter case, up-to-date
AV products enable users to disinfect themselves, transitioning
from the infected to the recovered state. In this section, we
focus on the former case (susceptible to immune state), while
the latter case (infected to recovered state) is discussed in
Section V-C.
If user i has an AV product installed, it may or may not be
effective against the new malware M when M first emerges in
the network at time t = 0. If an AV product is effective against
M , the user is considered to transition from the susceptible to
the immune state at time t = 0.
In practice, many malware programs use novel techniques
to evade detection by AV software [43], [44]. However, as
a malware spreads through a network, AV manufacturers
respond by providing software updates and clean-up solutions
(via either updated signatures or heuristic techniques [45]).
Not all AV companies can provide detection and clean-up
solutions at the same time though [46]. In fact, there are
cases where it takes AV providers several days to come up
with disinfecting solutions. For instance, Microsoft Malware
Protection Center provided detection and clean-up solutions
against the Conficker malware [30] on November 21, 2008
[47] while many other vendors such as Sophos and Trend-
Micro released disinfection solutions to their users several days
later, on November 26, 2008 [48].
If an AV product is not effective against the malware in the
first stages of its propagation, the user can still have a chance
of getting to the immune state if the AV manufacturer releases
working updates and the user’s AV software is updated before
he/she is infected. Because AV providers may not be able to
release product updates right away, we assume that the rate
at which AV products are updated can be a function such as
linearly increasing or exponentially increasing. Therefore, we
define βi(t), the probability of a node i transitioning from the
susceptible to the immune state, as follows:
βi(t) =
{
βˆ(t) if 0 < t ≤ Tmax
βmax if t ≥ Tmax
(4)
where βmax is the (maximum) percentage of the population
that has AV products installed on their computers (assumption
6, Section IV). Only a subset of this population, represented by
parameter βmin ≤ βmax, has AV products that are effective
against M at time t = 0. As AV manufacturers gradually
release updates against M , all AV users’s products will even-
tually be effective against M . Tmax is the time at which all AV
products have been updated and able to block/remove malware
M .
βˆ(t) denotes the percentage of users at time t who have
effective AV software against the new malware M, and βmin ≤
βˆ(t) ≤ βmax. βˆ(t) depends on the rate at which AV products
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TABLE II: Mathematical notations
Parameter Description
V Total number of nodes (users) in the graph (network).
Xi(t) State of the node i at each time t (see Eq. (1))
pi Probability of user i following a malicious post, unknowingly downloading the malware and executing
it. This probability depends on several factors as discussed in Section V-A.
Ni Set of node i’s neighbors.
di Degree of node i
δi Probability of user i accepting clean-up solutions from their non-infectious friends (Section V-C).
qi Probability of user i recovering independently without assistance from his/her friends (Section V-C).
pii Probability of an infected user i taking no action to remove malware. That is, pii = 1− qi− δi (Section
V-C).
γi(t) Probability of user i transitioning from the susceptible to infected state. This probability depends on the
number of friends user i has and probability pi listed above (Section V-A).
βi(t) Probability of user i transitioning from the susceptible to immune state. This probability depends on the
effectiveness of user i’s AV software, or the availability of AV updates to user i. [Some AV product
vendors release updates against malware M sooner than others (Section V-B)]
βmax Percentage of the social network population that has AV products installed on their computers. [However,at
the beginning of the propagation only a subset of these AV products, βmin, are effective against the new
malware M (Section V-B).]
αi(t) Probability of user i transitioning from the infected to recovered state. This probability depends on the
number of user i infected friends at time t and probability δi listed above. The higher these values, the
higher the probability αi (Section V-C).
βMin
βMax
0 TMax T
Exponential
Linear
Fig. 3: βˆ(t) as linear and exponential functions
are updated, and thus can be a function such as linear or
exponential increase, where t denotes the time unit passed.
As a linearly or exponentially increasing function, it can be
represented as βˆ(t) = c0 × t or βˆ(t) = c1ec2×t respectively,
where c0, c1 and c2 are constants. The value of βˆ(t) increases
until it reaches βmax at time Tmax, when βmax×V users have
effective AV software against the new malware M , where V
is the total number of users in the network.
C. Transition from Infected to Recovered State
As discussed in the previous sections, a user can be infected
by not having an AV product, or having an AV product that
is not effective against the new malware. In the former case,
the user would seek clean-up solutions in order to disinfect
his OSN profile and computer. In the latter case, the infected
user’s AV product would need to be updated in order to remove
the new malware.
Recent malware has presented a major obstacle to users
seeking clean-up solutions or AV updates: such a malware
would block users’ access to web sites of reputable AV
software providers. This obstacle has been observed in several
malware attacks [7], [9], [10], [30]–[32], including those on
Facebook such as Magnet [9], Koobface [10], and extension-
based malware [7] that targets Facebook users’ browsers. By
blocking users’ access to web sites of AV software providers
or disabling their AV software, attackers can maintain their
control of the infected systems as long as possible to carry
out malicious activities. In Appendix B of the supplementary
file, we discuss techniques malware creators use to prevent
infected systems from being connected to AV provider web
sites.
In this case, an infected user would have to search for clean-
up solutions or AV updates via means other than direct access
to or download from AV provider web sites. Following are
examples of such methods:
1) One method is to search for clean-up solutions from
third-party web sites (which are not blocked by the
malware). This method carries the risk of downloading
another malware disguised as an AV product [49], [50]
and is recommended only to knowledgeable users.
2) A safer alternative is for the infected user to seek assis-
tance from his OSN friends, especially those who were
infected but have found effective disinfecting products
and have recovered. This practice was observed during
a large-scale attack on Facebook caused by Magnet
malware [9] that left more than 110,000 users infected
in less than two days [9]. During the attack, infected
users were blocked by the malware from accessing AV
provider web sites. As a result, they posted messages
on social media, seeking help from their OSN friends
to remove the malware from their systems. Clean-up
solutions suggested by trusted friends have been tested
by them and therefore usually safe and effective. We
term the practice of seeking clean-up solutions from
OSN friends collaborative disinfection. This method is
the safest and easiest for less sophisticated computer
users.
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3) Another safe method is to access AV provider web
sites directly to download AV updates using a second,
clean computer and then transfer the AV update to the
infected computer. (However, not all users have access
to a second, clean computer.) We call this practice and
method 1 discussed above independent disinfection (as
opposed to collaborative disinfection with help from
friends).
We consider both independent disinfection (method 1 and 3)
and collaborative disinfection (method 2) when calculating the
probability αi(t) of user i transitioning from the infected to
the recovered state.
Let δi and di represent the probability of user i accepting
clean-up solutions from his/her friends and the degree of node
i, respectively. Furthermore, let qi and Ni denote the proba-
bility of user i recovering without help from his/her friends
(independent disinfection), and the set of node i’s neighbors
respectively. The probability αi(t) of user i transitioning from
the infected to the recovered state is given by the following
equation:
αi(t) = qi +
δi
di
∑
j∈Ni
(1− P (Xj(t− 1) = Inf)) (5)
Eq. (5) takes into account both independent disinfection
(parameter qi) and collaborative disinfection (the second term
of the equation). In the case of collaborative disinfection, the
higher the probability that user i accepts clean-up solutions
from his/her friends, the higher his/her chance of recovering.
The more non-infected friends user i has, the higher his/her
chance of getting clean-up solutions from them to recover. (It
is logical to assume that infected friends cannot help. If they
had knowledge of clean-up solutions, they would already have
disinfected their systems and moved to the recovered sate.)
So far we have discussed the transition probabilities based
on the model illustrated in Fig. 2. In the next subsection, we
provide the complete model characterizing the propagation of
a Trojan malware in an OSN.
D. The Complete Model
A social network is represented by an undirected graph G =
(V, E) where each vertex v ∈ V represents a user and each
edge e ∈ E denotes the mutual relationship between the two
users represented by the two end vertices.
For each user i, the network graph provides the following
information: node degree di and the set of user i’s neighbours
Ni. Each user i is also associated with a set of parameters in
the form of a vector {pi, δi, qi}. Brief descriptions of these
parameters can be found in Table II. At time t = 0 (when
the malware M first appears at the infiltrating node), the
probability of a user i being in a state X is as follows,
where X = {Sus, Inf,Rec, Imm}. For the infiltrating node,
denoted by k, P (Xk(0) = Inf) = 1 because k is considered
the first node in the network infected with malware M .
P (Xk(0) = X) = 0 for every other state X , namely,
susceptible, immune and recovered.
We assume that AV providers release updates against mal-
ware M over time according to a function βˆ(t) (see Section
V-B).
Given the above initializations, Equations (3) to (5) and the
transition model illustrated in Fig. 2, we calculate the proba-
bility of a user i being in the susceptible, immune, infected,
and recovered state as follows, with brief explanations given
in Table III.
P (Xi(t+ 1) = Sus) = (1− βi(t))P (Xi(t) = Sus)+
P (visiti(t) = true) γi(t) P (Xi(t) = Sus)
(6)
P (Xi(t+ 1) = Inf) = P (visiti(t) = true)γi(t)×
P (Xi(t) = Sus) + (1− P (visiti(t) = true)×
αi(t))P (Xi(t) = Inf)
(7)
P (Xi(t+ 1) = Rec) = P (visiti(t) = true)αi(t)×
P (Xi(t) = Inf) + P (Xi(t) = Rec)
(8)
P (Xi(t+ 1) = Imm) = βi(t)P (Xi(t) = Sus)+
P (Xi(t) = Imm)
(9)
Equations (6) to (9) are calculated using Equations (3), (4)
and (5) derived earlier and summarized below:
γi(t) = 1−
∏
j∈Ni
(1− piP (Xj(t− 1) = Inf))
βi(t) =
{
βˆ(t) if 0 ≤ t < Tmax
βmax if t ≥ Tmax
αi(t) = qi +
δi
di
∑
j∈Ni
(1− P (Xj(t− 1) = Inf))
Using Equations (6) to (9), we calculate the expected
number of users in a each state X = {Sus, Inf,Rec, Imm}
at each time t as follows:
EX(t) =
i=V∑
i=1
P (Xi(t) = X) (10)
The computational complexity for computing EX(t) is
O(E), where E is the number of edges in the network graph.
A detailed discussion of the complexity is given in Appendix
C of the supplementary file.
VI. MODEL VALIDATION
In Sections VI and VII, we evaluate the accuracy of the
model for estimating the propagation speed of a Trojan mal-
ware in an OSN. Due to the lack of real data sets for evaluating
analytic models [23], authors of all existing works in the
literature have used simulations to validate their analytical
models [23], [24], [26], [39]. We use the same approach to
validate our proposed model in this article.
The simulation program was implemented using MATLAB
and based on discrete-event simulation. The propagation pro-
cess was simulated as described in Section III. We used the
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TABLE III: Brief explanations of Equations (6) to (9)
Equation Explanations
(6)
A susceptible user remains in the susceptible state with probability 1− βi(t). That is, the user has not been infected yet
(as determined by probability γi(t)), or become immune yet, i.e., his/her AV program has not yet been updated to block
the new malware M (as determined by function βi(t)). Upon visiting the social network, the user may become infected
with probability γi(t).
(7)
Upon visiting the social network, a susceptible user will become infected with probability γi(t) as shown in Fig. 2. Also,
an infected user can recover via independent or collaborative disinfection with probability αi(t) while visiting the social
network; otherwise, the user stays in the infected state with probability 1− αi(t).
(8)
Upon visiting the social network, an infected user can recover with probability αi(t) via independent or collaborative
disinfection. A recovered user will stay in the recovered state for the rest of the time with probability 1 due to effective
AV solutions against malware M obtained during the disinfection stage.
(9)
An immune user at time t = 0 will stay immune throughout the course of the attack with probability 1. In addition
to these users, a subset of susceptible users will become immune over time thanks to their AV products being updated
gradually by AV providers, as determined by function βi(t)).
Facebook network subgraph described in Section II to run
the simulations and to compute numerical results based on
the proposed model. We then compare simulation results with
numerical results obtained from the model. Each data point in
the graphs was averaged over 100 runs, each of which started
with a different infiltrating node (user) selected randomly.
A. Metrics
To compare numerical results obtained from the analytical
model with simulation results, we use the following metrics:
number of infected, susceptible and protected users, respec-
tively. The number of protected users is the sum of the
numbers of immune and recovered users. Since both immune
and recovered users are eventually protected from the new
malware M, we combine them into one group in the graphs
to make the graphs more readable.
To obtain numerical results from the analytical model, we
calculated the expected number of users EX(t) in each state
as follows: EX(t) =
∑i=V
i=1 P (Xi(t) = X), where X denotes
the state of a user i and X = {Sus, Inf,Rec, Imm}. For
example
∑i=V
i=1 P (Xi(t) = Inf) gives the expected number
of infected users in the network at time t.
We compare the expected number of infected (susceptible,
protected) users computed from the model with the number
of infected (susceptible, protected) users obtained from the
simulations.
We use the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient
[51] for the comparison. The correlation coefficient r ranges
from −1 to +1, where a value of 1 (−1) implies a positive
(negative) perfect relationship between two variables X and
Y , and a value of 0 implies no linear correlation between the
variables. A positive correlation means that if X increases then
Y increases. A negative correlation means that if X increases
then Y decreases. We use Pearson correlation coefficients to
determine the correlation between our analytical model results
and the simulation results. We expect that an accurate model
should have high positive correlations with the corresponding
simulation results, i.e., r ≈ 1.
The correlation coefficient of two variables X and Y is
calculated as follows [51]:
r =
cov(X,Y )
σXσY
(11)
To measure the significance of the correlation, we calculate
the p-value of the correlation coefficient. A p-value close to
zero means that the correlation is “statistically significant”
(i.e., rejecting the null hypothesis) [51].
B. Simulation Process
We implemented a Trojan malware based on the propagation
mechanism discussed in Section III. The simulation process is
summarized as follows. In the first step of each experiment, a
node (user) in the social network graph is chosen randomly as
a seed for infiltration. (In practice, the malware creator may
implement several fake profiles for infiltration.) We mark this
node as infected. The infiltrating user will post a malicious
link either on her wall or directly on the wall of each of her
friends. When a susceptible user i sees the malicious link, she
will follow the link and execute the malicious embedded code
with a probability pi. The probability pi reflects the fact that
some people may be more cautious and do not follow the link
or they do not see the link (e.g., because it was pushed far
down on a page by many more recent posts). (If user i does
not click on the link, she remains in the susceptible state. An
immune or recovered user will stay in the same state until the
end of an experiment.)
The malware will then post malicious link on the wall of the
newly infected user for her friends to see. The above process
then continues with these friends. In our simulation, the
above steps repeat until the average number of infected nodes
remains less than ten for four consecutive time units; that
is, further propagation of the malware will not significantly
increase the number of victims. (In real life, the malware
creator may stop the propagation when the number of infected
nodes reaches a certain number.) At the end of each time unit,
we counted the number of infected, immune and protected
users and recorded them to plot the resulting graphs.
In all the experiments, we assume that the Trojan malware
blocks users from accessing AV software providers’ web sites,
as discussed in Section V-C. In this case, infected users
can seek assistance from their OSN friends to find clean-
up solutions (collaborative disinfection) or search for clean-
up solutions themselves (independent disinfection). We study
both cases in our experiments.
C. Experiment Settings
We conducted five sets of experiments. In the first four sets
of experiments, we assume that user message checking time
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follows an exponential distribution with mean 40, i.e., τ ∼
E(40). This parameter comes from previous works [23], [24],
[26]. In the fifth set, we examine the case in which users visit
the social network more often on average, i.e., τ ∼ E(20).
In all experiments, we assume that the probability of a user i
clicking on the malicious link and subsequently executing the
Trojan code is pi = 0.5, unless otherwise stated.
Following are the settings of the experiments:
• Experiment I: In the first experiment, we study the
impact of malware execution probability pi = p by
comparing two cases of p = 0.5 and p = 0.75. We
assume that no clean-up solution is available to users
(δi = 0 and qi = 0).
• Experiment II: In the second experiment, we study the
impact of gradual AV update releases by AV product
manufacturers on the Trojan propagation by examining
different βi(t) functions as discussed in Section V-B.
We assume there is no clean-up solution (δi = 0 and
qi = 0) available to observe the effects of gradual AV
update release on containing the malware.
• Experiment III: In the third experiment, we study the
effects of collaborative disinfection by varying δi from 0
to 1. We assume no independent disinfection (qi = 0).
• Experiment IV: In the fourth experiment, we study the
effects of independent disinfection by comparing two
cases: qi = 0 vs. qi = 0.5 . We assume no collaborative
disinfection (δi = 0).
• Experiment V: In the fifth experiment, we study the
impact of user message checking time on the Trojan
propagation by comparing different τ distributions. We
assume that users visit the social network more often on
average, i.e., τ ∼ E(20). We compare this case with
the case where τ ∼ E(40) as used in all the previous
experiments.
A summary of the experiments and their parameters and
results are given in Table IV. The graphs obtained from the
experiments show the number of users (infected, susceptible
and protected) over time, unless otherwise stated.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the results obtained from the five
experiments described above.
A. Experiment I: Malware Execution Probability
To study the effects of probability pi on the propagation
of M , we consider two cases of p = 0.5 and p = 0.75. We
assume there is no available clean-up solution (δi = 0 and
qi = 0) in both cases.
Set I: p = 0.5: Figure 4(a) show the results obtained from
the analytical model and the simulation for this experiment. As
can be seen, the number of susceptible users decreases while
the number of infected users increases over time due to the
lack of effective AV protection. The number of infected nodes
rises until reaching its maximum, which is the initial number
of susceptible nodes. The number of protected users stays at
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Fig. 4: Experiment I: Impact of malware execution probability
on malware propagation - βi=0, δi=0, qi=0
zero during the course of this experiment due to lack of AV
protection.
Set II: p = 0.75: Figure 4(b) shows a similar trend of
users’ transitions from the susceptible to the infected state.
However, since the malware execution probability is increased
from p = 0.5 to p = 0.75, the rate of users becoming infected
is higher than the previous Set. For instance, in the 50th and
100th time units, the number of infections are 2,073 and 3,306
respectively when p = 0.5, while the these values are equal to
2,446 and 3,591 when p = 0.75. That is, a maximum of 10%
more infection in the network at earlier stage of propagation.
The results in Fig. 4(a) and 4(b) show that the model
closely matches the simulation results. For instance, in Fig.
4(b), the average error between the predicted values and the
simulation results are less than 1% for the susceptible and
infected user curves, respectively. The largest discrepancy
is 2%, which occurs at the 30th time unit. The Pearson
correlation coefficient also shows a close positive correlation
between the model and the simulation with r ≈ 0.99 and
p − value ≈ 0 for both groups of users, susceptible and
infected.
In summary, without effective AV products or clean-up so-
lutions, all susceptible users will eventually become infected.
Obviously, the higher the probability of pi, the higher the
number of infected users in earlier stages of propagation.
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TABLE IV: Experiment parameters and summary of results
Experiment Figure Parameters Summary of Results
Experiment I - Malware Execution
Probability (Section VII-A) Fig. 4
βi=0, δi=0, qi=0, pi=0.5,
p={0.5,0.75}
With no AV protection in place, all susceptible
users eventually become infected. The higher the
value of p, the higher the number of infected users
in earlier stages of propagation.
Experiment II - Gradual AV Update
Release (Section VII-B)
Fig. 5 and
6
βi linearly and exponentially increases
between 0 and 0.75, δi=0, qi=0, pi=0.5
Gradual release of AV updates help some suscepti-
ble nodes to become immune. However it does not
have direct impact on the nodes that are infected
with a blocking Trojan malware.
Fig. 7 βi linearly and exponentially increasesbetween 0 and 0.75, δi=0, qi=0, pi=0.5
The linear function outperforms the corresponding
exponential function in terms of containing the
malware propagation. The linear function allows
faster AV update release, resulting in more suscep-
tible users becoming immune in the early stages
of the propagation.
Experiment III - Collaborative Disinfec-
tion (Section VII-C)
Fig. 8(a) to
8(c)
β150 = 0.005t, δi={0.2,0.4}, qi=0,
pi=0.5
Collaborative disinfection helps infected nodes to
recover, resulting in fewer infected nodes in the
network. The higher the probability δi, the lower
the number of infections.
Experiment IV - Independent Disinfec-
tion (Section VII-D) Fig. 9
β150 = 0.005t, δi=0, qi={0.2,0.4},
pi=0.5
Independent disinfection results in lower numbers
of infected users. The higher the value of qi, the
lower the number of infections
Experiment V - Frequency of Visit (Sec-
tion VIII) Fig. 10
τi ∼ E(λ), λ = 20 δi={0., 0.2},
qi = 0, pi=0.5, βi={0, 0.005t}
The higher the visiting frequency, the higher the
number of infections
B. Experiment II: Gradual AV Update Release
In this experiment, we study the impact of gradual AV
update release on the Trojan propagation by examining differ-
ent βi(t) functions as discussed in Section V-B. In particular,
we consider two functions: linear and exponential. For each
function, we also examine how the rate at which AV updates
are released affects the numbers of susceptible, infected and
protected users.
We assume no available clean-up solution (δi = 0 and
qi = 0) to observe the effects of gradual AV update release
on containing the malware.
Linear Functions: Function βi increases linearly from 0 to
βmax, and βˆ(Tmax) = βmax. We set βmax = 0.75, according
to a survey conducted by Microsoft [52] in which 75% of the
respondents said that they had AV programs installed on their
systems. The value of Tmax indicates the rate at which AV
updates are released. The lower the value of Tmax, the faster
AV updates are released. We consider three Tmax values: 150,
100 and 25 time units, resulting in the following three linear
functions, respectively: βˆ150(t) = 0.005t, βˆ100(t) = 0.0076t
and βˆ25(t) = 0.031t.
The numerical and simulation results based on these three
functions are given in Fig. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c), respectively.
In all three cases, we observe the following:
1) The number of protected nodes increases over time
thanks to AV updates released gradually.
2) The number of infected nodes also increases over time
because we assume no clean-up solution is available.
(With clean-up solutions available to users, the number
of infections will eventually go down. We will study this
case in the next experiment.)
3) The number of susceptible nodes decreases over time.
They move to either the infected group (due to the
malware) or the protected group (due to AV updates
released gradually by AV providers).
We note that AV updates enable a large number of users
to move from the susceptible group to the protected group,
resulting in less infections when compared to the case where
there are no AV updates available (compared to Fig. 4(a)).
For instance, the analytical result in Fig. 5(a) shows that there
are 572 infected users at the end of the experiment while the
total number of infected users in Fig. 4(a) is 4,039 users. That
means about 85% less infected users compared to the case
where there are no AV updates, demonstrating the importance
of having AV protection.
Faster AV update release limits the spread of the malware
and protect more users from becoming infected. Going from
Fig. 5(a) to Fig. 5(b) and 5(c), we see that the number
of infected users decreases significantly. For instance, the
analytical result shows that at the 50th step, there are 206
and 65 infected users when Tmax = 100 and Tmax = 25,
respectively. This number is 576 infected users in Fig. 5(a)
when Tmax = 150, the slowest update rate in our experiment.
At the same time, we observe an increase in the number of
protected users as Tmax decreases from 150 to 25 (i.e., AV
updates are released at faster rates). To further illustrate this
point, we consolidated the curves representing the numbers of
protected users from Fig. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) and placed them
in Fig. 5(d). We can see from the new graph that the faster AV
updates are released, the higher the number of users become
protected. For instance, at the 50th step, there are 3,974, 3,833
and 3,465 protected users in the network for Tmax = 25, 100
and 150, respectively.
Exponential Functions: Similarly to the previous case, we
assume βmax = 0.75 and consider three Tmax values: 150,
100 and 25, resulting in the following three exponential
functions, respectively: βˆ150(t) ≈ 0.01 × et×0.029, βˆ100(t) ≈
0.01× et×0.044 and βˆ25(t) ≈ 0.01× et×0.18.
Figures 6(a), 6(b) and 6(c) show the results respectively. The
results are consistent with those obtained from the previous
set with the linear functions. That is, as more AV products are
updated, more users will become protected. For example, in
Fig. 6(b), the number of protected users increases from zero
to 2,266 at the 50th step.
AV updates result in less infections (Fig. 6(b)) than the case
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where no AV updates are released (Fig. 4(a)). By comparing
Fig. 6(b) and Fig. 4(a), we see 1,217 infected users versus
4,039 infected users, a difference of 70% at the 150th time
unit.
As the rate at which AV products are updated speeds up
(i.e., Tmax decreases), fewer users will be infected and more
users become protected. For example, at the 50th step, the
analytical results for Tmax = 150 show 1,304 infected and
2,146 protected users (Fig. 6(a)), while these numbers are 364
infected users and 3,675 protected users when Tmax = 25
(Fig. 6(c)). To further illustrate this point, the curves repre-
senting the numbers of protected users in Fig. 6(a), 6(b) and
6(c) are combined into Fig. 6(d). The combined graph shows
3,675, 2,822 and 2,590 protected users in the social network
for Tmax = 25, 100 and 150, respectively.
Linear vs. Exponential Functions: We observe that the
linear functions outperform the corresponding exponential
functions in terms of containing the malware propagation.
To facilitate the comparison, Fig. 7(a) shows the numbers
of protected users obtained from the linear and exponential
functions for Tmax = 125 (extracted from Fig. 4(a), and
6(a) and 6(a), respectively). Figure 7(a) shows that the linear
function allows more users to be come protected than the
exponential function: 3,465 versus 2,146 users at the 50th step,
or about 30% higher.
The explanation for the above observation is that the lin-
ear function grows faster than the exponential function for
0 < t ≤ Tmax, Tmax = 150 (refer to Fig. 3). The linear
function allows faster AV update release, resulting in more
susceptible users becoming immune in the early stages of the
propagation. To visualize this comparison, we consolidated the
curves representing the number of protected users in Fig. 4(a),
5(a) and 6(a) into the graph in Fig. 7(a).
Figure 7(a) also includes the curve of the numbers of
protected users extracted from Fig. 4(a) for the case of no
available AV updates. In this case, there are no immune users
because there are no effective AV products against malware
M and no AV updates either.
We arrive at the same conclusion when comparing the
graphs of the linear and the exponential functions, linear vs.
exponential, when Tmax = 100 and Tmax = 25. Figure 7(b)
shows three pairs of functions when Tmax = 150, 100, and
25. As can be seen, in all three cases, the linear functions (the
green curves) rises faster than the corresponding exponential
functions (the purple curves), leading to more protected users
over time.
C. Experiment III: Collaborative Disinfection
In this set of experiments, we examine the effects of col-
laborative disinfection, which is defined in Section V-C. Col-
laborative disinfection allows infected users who are blocked
by the malware from directly accessing AV provider web sites
to get clean-up solutions from their OSN friends.
We conducted on online survey asking 51 Facebook users
if they would accept clean-up solutions from their Facebook
friends if they were infected by such a malware. Approx-
imately 40% (39.2% to be exact) of the surveyed people
responded said that they would do so and would accept clean-
up solutions from their Facebook friends. We use the result
from this survey in this set of experiments, by setting δi to a
maximum value of 0.4.
In this experiment, we examine different values of δi,
the probability of accepting clean-up solutions from friends.
Specifically, we consider δi = 0, 0.2 and 0.4. (The value
of 0.4 comes from the survey mentioned above.) We assume
that AV updates are released according to the linear function
βˆ150(t) = 0.005t, in order to see the effectiveness of collab-
orative disinfection when comparing the results from this set
of experiments with those obtained from Experiment II where
no disinfection solutions were available. As before, we assume
no independent disinfection (qi = 0) and users’ probability of
executing the malware is pi = 0.5. The results of this set of
experiments are illustrated in Figures 5(a), 8(a) and 8(b) for
δi = 0, 0.2 and 0.4, respectively.
In the graphs, the number of infections first increases, then
reaches a maximum value (points A and B in Fig. 8(a) and
8(b), respectively). After this point, the number of infections
goes down thanks to infected users applying clean-up solutions
suggested by their friends and moving from the infected state
to the recovered state. As the number of infections going down,
the number of protected users going up as users move from
the infected state to the recovered state.
In general, collaborative disinfection plays an important role
in containing (and almost stopping) the malware. To illustrate
this point, we extracted the curves of the number of infections
from Fig. 5(a), 8(b) and 8(b) and grouped them into one
graph in Fig. 8(c). The new graph shows that without clean-
up solutions the number of infected users first increases then
stays almost constant for the rest of the experiments because
none of them is disinfected. With collaborative disinfection,
the number of infections goes down after reaching a maximum
value (points A and B), thanks to clean-up solutions that
allow user to be disinfected and move to the recovered state.
Furthermore, the higher the δi value, the more infected users
transition to the recovered state. In Fig. 8(c), there are 573
infected users in the network at the 50th time step in the case
of no clean-up solutions, while this number reduces to 163 and
55 in the case of collaborative disinfection, when δ equals to
0.2 and 0.4, respectively.
Figures 8(a) and 8(b) also show that there is a good
match between the analytical model and simulation results.
For instance, in Fig. 8(a), the discrepancy between model and
simulation results are less than 6% for all the susceptible,
protected and infected graphs with the largest of 6% at the
twenty third step between the protected curves. The Pearson
correlation coefficient also shows close positive correlation be-
tween two series with at least r ≈ 0.98 and p−value ≈ 0 for
all three curves, susceptible, infected and protected. A similar
comparison is also observed in Fig. 8(b) when δi = 0.4.
D. Experiment IV: Independent Disinfection
In this set of experiments, we examine the effects of
independent disinfection as discussed in Section V-C. Because
the new malware prevents users from accessing directly AV
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Fig. 5: Experiment II: Gradual AV update release, linear functions, δi=0, qi=0, pi=0.5
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provider web sites, knowledgeable users would search for
clean-up solutions from third-party web sites not blocked by
the malware. Another method is to access AV provider web
sites via a second, clean computer and subsequently transfer
the disinfecting software to the infected computer.
We model these practices, called independent disinfection,
using parameter qi, where qi is the probability of user i
finding a clean-up solution without assistance from his/her
OSN friends.
In this experiment, we consider different qi values, specif-
ically, qi = 0, 0.2 and 0.4. We assume that AV updates are
released according to the linear function βˆ150(t) = 0.005t,
in order to see the effectiveness of collaborative disinfection
when comparing the results from this set of experiments with
those obtained from Experiment II where no disinfection solu-
tions were available. We assume no collaborative disinfection
(δi = 0). Users’ probability of executing the malware is
pi = 0.5.
The results of this set of experiments are illustrated in
Fig. 9(a) and 9(b) for qi = 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. As the
graphs show, the number of infected users reaches a maximum
value then goes down gradually until most infected users
become disinfected. Clean-up solutions allow users to disinfect
themselves and move to the recovered (protected) state. As the
number of infected users decreases, the number of protected
users rises.
We also observe that higher qi values allow for better con-
tainment of the malware. In other words, as qi increases, the
maximum number of infected users decreases. For example,
in Fig. 9(a) when qi = 0.2, the maximum number of infected
users is equal to 277 (point A), while in Fig. 9(b), this value
for qi=0.4 is equal to 151 (point B). Fig. 9(c), which combines
the curves of the number of infected users from Fig. 5(a), 9(a)
and 9(b), further illustrates this observation. When qi = 0.4,
the number of infections goes down at a faster rate than that
when qi = 0.2.
Figure 5(a) depicts the case where qi = 0 and the number
of infected users increased and stayed constant until the end
of the experiment because no disinfecting solutions were
available. In contrast, in Fig. 9(a) and 9(b), the number of
infections decreases after points A and B, respectively, until
most infected users are disinfected.
In summary, knowledgeable users who find clean-up so-
lutions independently are able to recover from the infected
state, resulting in fewer infected users, and thus more protected
users, in the social network. The higher the value of qi, the
higher the number of protected users in the network.
VIII. EXPERIMENT V: FREQUENCY OF VISITS
In the previous experiments, we assume that users visit
the social network following an exponential distribution τi ∼
E(40). In this experiment, we assume that users visit the social
network more often on average, following an exponential
distribution τi ∼ E(20).
We repeated the experiments whose results are shown in
Figs. 4(a) and 8(a) using the new user message checking time
τi ∼ E(20). The new experimental results are given in Figs
10(a) and 10(b), respectively. The new graphs show the same
trends as those in the previous experiments. When there is no
AV update and no clean-up solution (Fig. 10(a)), the number
of infected users increases over time. With gradual linear AV
release updates and collaborative disinfection (Fig. 10(b)), the
number of infected users increases at first, until it reaches to
a certain point. After that, the number of infected users goes
down thanks to collaborative disinfection.
In order to compare the impact of frequency of visits, we
consolidated the curves representing the numbers of infected
users from Fig. 4(a) (for τi ∼ E(40)) and Fig. 10(a) (for
τi ∼ E(20)) and placed them in Fig. 10(c). The combined
graph shows that the higher the frequency of visits, the higher
the number of infected users within the same time frame. For
instance, at the 50th time unit, there are 2,323 infected users in
the system when τi ∼ E(40), while this number is 3,484 when
τi ∼ E(20), a staggering difference of 30% more infected
users within the same time frame.
We also combined the curves representing the numbers of
infected users from Fig. 8(a) (for τi ∼ E(40)) and Fig.
10(b) (for τi ∼ E(20)) and placed them in Fig. 10(d). We
observe a similar comparison: the higher the frequency of
visits, the higher the number of infected users within the same
time frame. For instance, at the 25th time unit, there are 793
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Fig. 8: Experiment III: Collaborative disinfection - qi=0,
βˆ150(t) = 0.005t
infected users in the network when τi ∼ E(20). This number
is 215 infected users when τi ∼ E(40).
IX. RELATED WORK
We broadly classify existing research related to our work
into two topics: (1) studies and modeling of malware propa-
gation dynamics, and (2) countermeasures.
A. Studies and Modeling of Malware Propagation Dynamics
Most existing studies on propagations of Trojans in OSNs
are based on simulations [3], [13]–[15] or experiments [10].
Yan et al. [13] studied the impact of network topology
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Fig. 9: Experiment IV: Independent disinfection - δi=0, pi=0.5,
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and users’ probability of following malicious links on the
propagation of Trojans (which are termed “active worms”
in [13]). Their simulation results suggest that infected users
who seldom visit the social network (i.e., equivalent to being
quarantined) help to slow down the propagation of worms.
On the other hand, the higher the probability that users follow
malicious links, the faster a worm spreads in the network.
Faghani and his collaborators [14], [15] also showed via
simulations that the higher the probability that users click on
malicious links, the faster a malware propagates in a social
network. Fan et al. [3] studied propagations of worms/viruses
hidden in (malicious) third-party applications built on the
Facebook application platform. Their simulation results show
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that worms/viruses spread faster on Facebook than in an email
network due to (1) users spending more time on Facebook
than on email, and (2) the topological characteristics of OSNs,
namely, power-law distribution of node degrees and high
clustering coefficient. Thomas et al. [10] traced the activities
of Koobface, a Trojan that targeted OSN users, for one month
to study its propagation characteristics.
Existing works on modelling malware propagation in online
social networks include [16], [17] and [18]. Faghani and his
collaborators [16], [17] modeled the propagation of cross-
site-scripting (XSS) worms in OSNs. Sanzgiri et al. [18]
modeled the propagation of Trojans in the social network
Twitter, which is represented by directed graphs due to one-
directional (follower-followee) relationships. To the best of our
knowledge, the analytical model we propose in this article is
the first that characterizes the propagation of Trojans in social
networks represented by undirected graphs such as Facebook,
LinkedIn and Orkut.
There exist works that model the propagation of worms and
malware (not necessarily Trojans) in other types of networks
such as people, email and cellular phones. Many of these
models [19]–[22] assumed that each user is directly connected
to every other user in the same network (also known as
“homogeneous mixing”). This assumption does not hold true
for a real-world OSN such as Facebook where each user
is directly connected to only his/her friends. As a result,
the “homogeneous mixing” assumption may lead to an over-
estimation of the infection rate in a real OSN [23], [24]. Cheng
et al. [25] proposed a propagation model for malware that
targets multimedia messaging service (MMS) and bluetooth
devices; this model also assumes “homogeneous mixing”, and
is thus not applicable to real OSNs. Chen and Ji [26] and
Chen et al. [27] modeled the spreading of scanning worms
in computer networks. Zou et al [24] proposed a propagation
model for email worms that takes into account user behavior
such as checking time and probability of opening email
attachments. Komnios et al. [28] modeled the propagation of
email worms using differential equations. Wen et al. [23] also
modeled the propagation of malware in email networks and
in semi-directed networks represented by mixed graphs (i.e.,
a subset of edges are directed while the others are undirected).
B. Countermeasures
Detecting malware is also an active and important research
topic in social networks. For instance, Rahman et al. [53]
presented a Facebook application that identifies “socware”
in OSNs. They defined socware as any parasitic behavior in
OSNs. This includes posts that spread malware, web pages
pointed to malware, false reward posts, rogue Facebook appli-
cations, requests, surveys, and likejacking. They used machine
learning techniques to distinguish between socware posts and
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benign posts. They estimated the false negative rate of their
system to be about 0.3%.
Xu et al. [54] proposed a correlation-based scheme to
detect active worm propagation in OSNs. They assigned
“decoy friends” to a subset of users, and the “decoy friends”
monitored network activities. Stringhini et al. [55] studied
the detection of spammers using “honey” profiles in three
major OSNs: Facebook, Twitter and MySpace. They applied
their classifier to about 800,000 profiles and detected 130
spammers, most of which were related to adult websites.
Yan et al. [13] described three approaches for monitoring
users in OSNs in order to detect malware using (1) node degree
metric, (2) user activities and (3) network partition into small
islands. In the first approach, nodes with the highest degrees
are chosen to be monitored. In the second approach, the most
active nodes are selected for monitoring. Examples of the most
active nodes are major broadcasting companies such as CNN
and BBC, which post news updates frequently throughout the
day via OSNs (e.g., Facebook and Twitter networks). In the
third approach, an OSN is partitioned into small islands, and
every message exchanged between islands is inspected for
potential viruses/malware.
Faghani and Nguyen [16] also studied the effectiveness of
several metrics used for monitoring user activities in OSNs to
detect malware. Their simulation results show that monitoring
users that have high numbers of connections to different com-
munities (i.e., high cross-clique connectivity) help to detect
propagating malware earlier than using the other metrics.
Cao et al. presented PathCutter [56], a tool that can detect
traditional DOM-based XSS, and content sniffing XSS vulner-
abilities in social networks.
Livshits et al. [57] designed a detection and containment
method called Spectator [57]. Spectator uses a tainting and
tagging approach to detect the spread of JavaScript worms
which is implemented as a proxy.
X. CONCLUSION
In this article, we present an analytical model to study
propagation characteristics of Trojan malware and factors that
impact the propagation dynamics of Trojans in an online social
network.
Unlike most previous works, the proposed model assumes
all the topological characteristics of real online social net-
works, namely, low average shortest distance, power-law
distribution of node degrees and high clustering coefficient.
Furthermore, the model takes into account attacking trends of
modern Trojans (e.g., their ability to block users’ access to
AV provider websites), the role of AV products, and security
practices such as gradual AV update release by AV providers
and users’ collaborative disinfection. These factors were never
considered in existing works. By taking into account these
factors, the proposed model can accurately and realistically
estimate the infection rate caused by a Trojan malware in an
OSN as well the recovery rate of the user population.
The model is validated using a Facebook sub-graph. The
numerical results obtained from the model closely match the
simulation results. While being accurate, the model also has
low computational complexity, in the order of O(E), where
E is the number of edges in the network graph.
From the numerical and simulation results, we draw the
following conclusions and lessons. AV products play an im-
portant role in protecting OSN users from Trojans. For zero-
day or very novel malware, the faster AV providers release
updates/patches, the more users will be protected. In the case
of blocking malware, collaborative disinfection is an effective
mechanism that helps infected users to recover, especially
in cases of sophisticated Trojans that use advanced social
engineering techniques to deceive OSN users.
User awareness of security threats and safe browsing prac-
tices play an important role in protecting OSN users from
Trojans by slowing down the propagation of malware. OSN
administrators should launch campaigns and advertisements
to educate users about safe browsing practices (e.g., not
following unknown links) and about new malicious social
engineering techniques as soon they are discovered. In the case
of blocking malware, OSN providers should notify infected
users via different channels, e.g., short message service (SMS)
or email, and provide them with clean-up solutions as early
as possible.
In our future work, we will enhance our model to include
multiple infiltrating nodes. We will conduct surveys to accu-
rately model user behaviour of following unknown links and
executing hidden malicious code (probability pi). We will also
research timelines of AV updates released by AV providers in
past attacks to derive different functions βˆ(t) that reflect real-
world practices.
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